The Christchurch Civic Creche Case


News Reports - Main Index


2003 - Jan-May

 




Otago Daily Times
April 2 2002

Independent, regionally-based appeal court is needed

An international appeal court based in the South Pacific might be a better option than the Government's proposed Supreme Court as New Zealand's final court of appeal, writes Fred Fastier.

Professor Fred Fastier is a retired Dunedin academic.

The Supreme Court Bill, which is now before a parliamentary select committee, is concerned almost entirely with the setting up and running of a final appellate court. Hence, it is tempting to suppose this Bill is of little concern to persons other than some lawyers. In fact, its enactment would have serious consequences for many New Zealanders.

Government already has too few restraints. There is no upper house to hold up hasty or intemperate legislation; there are too few MPs to resist domination by Cabinet; the civil service has lost much of its independence; the universities are being muzzled; and citizens lack the protection of an effective constitution.

Some persons who would never win an electorate become MPs on the basis of party membership, despite the fact that the Government may disregard party manifesto and election promises (as with the continuance of the supertax and the introduction of Rogernomics). In these circumstances, it is especially important for there to be a final appellate court that is obviously independent of the executive arm of government.

The importance of being able to contest executive decisions is well illustrated by a recent case involving the University of Otago. In 1994, the then Minister of Education, Dr Lockwood Smith, announced the university's funding for dental education would be cut by upwards of 40%. This appalling ministerial directive resulted in a huge increase in tuition fees, which neared $22,000 a year by 1999. Many potential students were deterred from studying dentistry.

A judicial review of the situation led to Justice Goddard finding that the minister had made several "gross errors of fact" in reaching a decision that was "so erroneous that it could only be categorised as irrational". This trenchant criticism did not deter the succeeding government from appealing (unsuccessfully) against the awarding of nearly $15 million to the university and former dental students.

Persons who claim that the law is "an idiot" should remember that law-making is the prerogative of Parliament. Whereas lawyers are concerned, essentially, with existing laws, MPs introduce new laws and amend others, not always commendably.

A substantial proportion of our legislation has been slipshod. Though many of the defects have been quickly noted, amendment of the law has often come too late to prevent unfortunate consequences. Some of the legislation has been utterly execrable: for example, the Waterfront Strike Emergency Regulations, which prohibited not only freedom of speech in respect to the strike, but also the supplying of food to a striker's family.

It is vital for democracy that our final court of appeal should not only be, but also be seen to be, independent of political pressure.

The Government's case for ending appeals to the judicial committee of the Privy Council is summarised in the overview of the Bill, where it is claimed, inter alia, the judges of the proposed court would have "a greater understanding of local conditions". The presumption is that the only alternative to the Privy Council is a supreme court based in New Zealand. However, there are other possibilities, including the creation of a supreme court for Australia, New Zealand and some other countries of the South Pacific region.

If Australia were, like New Zealand, a single state from a legal viewpoint, I would be reluctant to raise the possibility; but Australia is, in fact, a confederation of states that are commonly opposed to one another and to "Canberra". This is the very situation in which legal problems could be thrashed out by judges who combine a good understanding of local conditions with international considerations.

As Sir Geoffrey Palmer has pointed out in his New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis (which provides details of some of the ills to which I have been alluding), we "cannot restrict ourselves any more to the content of the law in New Zealand because that is not the way that law practice is evolving. Indeed, much of our legislation has its origins in international obligations. The Legislative Advisory Committee in 1992 listed more than 185 New Zealand statutes that seemed to be affected in some way by treaty obligations."

It is of particular importance that our Closer Economic Relations agreement with Australia should not be messed up by quite unnecessary legal complications.

I was delighted to learn that the United Future party has also been considering the possibility of New Zealand combining with nearby countries to form an international appeal court. Moreover, it has succeeded in getting the date for submissions on the Supreme Court Bill extended until April 11. As Act New Zealand MP Stephen Franks said, the request for submissions to a select committee is a poor substitute for a referendum. Even so, it might prevent governments taking a step further to untrammelled power.

Recently, many New Zealanders have been reading Lynley Hood's A City Possessed. This is a detailed account, not only of the trial of Peter Ellis, but also of the building up of a climate of opinion that almost certainly precluded a fair trial. Due to the efforts of pressure groups, Parliament has so altered the rules of evidence obtaining in child abuse trials that the scales of justice were savagely tipped against the defendant. Witnesses are ordinarily required to give evidence in person and to be subject to cross-examination, because that is thought to make it much easier for the judge and jury to assess the credibility of the evidence.

In the Christchurch creche case, the children did not appear in court, their evidence being provided in the form of videotapes. It was presumed that children of even that tender age would be telling the truth. As it happened, the oldest subsequently admitted that his evidence was false. It is difficult to imagine how some of the acts that Mr Ellis was alleged to have committed could have taken place at all, let alone without their having been witnessed by adults; yet no adult witnesses of these acts were produced by the prosecution. Its case was based on what could be deduced from videotapes featuring preschool children.

Why do I mention this case? My basic concern is the part played in it by defective legislation. Altering rules of evidence made it possible to obtain a conviction that almost certainly would not have resulted had the ordinary rules applied.

Our final appellate court must be able to decide whether a case was properly tried according to the laws of New Zealand; it must be able to take account of flaws that violate fundamental human rights.