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A judgment released on Christmas
Eve turning on s 23G of the Evidence
Act 1908 could open the floodgates for review of hundreds of child sexual
abuse convictions entered over the last 15 years. In R v A (CA 123/04, 16 December 2004), the Court of Appeal
considered whether the evidence of a registered psychologist called at trial
complied with s 23G of the Evidence Act.
Section 23G governs the
admissibility of expert evidence in child sexual abuse cases. The section
authorizes the giving of expert evidence on the question whether a
complainant’s behaviour was consistent or inconsistent with that of a
sexually abused child of similar age. The expert may not give
an opinion under the section as to whether or not the child has been abused,
or whether or not the accused is the perpetrator. The Court in R v A held, “not only must the
evidence say whether there is consistency or inconsistency with the behaviour
of sexually abused children of the same age group, but the expert must
articulate how consistent it is and also say if it is consistent with other
factors”. “What the Court is
saying is you’ve got to know how likely a behaviour is if there’s sexual
abuse, and how likely it is if there’s no sexual abuse. That’s the proper
measure of its probative value,” Bernard Robertson, co-author of Interpreting Evidence: Evaluating
Forensic Science in the Courtroom and chapters of Cross on Evidence said. According to Robertson, the “bald
statement” that the evidence is consistent with sexual abuse is of no
probative value and is “hence irrelevant”. Commentators claim the
evidence given as to whether behaviour was consistent with sexual abuse in
the infamous Christchurch Civic Crčche case R v Ellis under s 23G(2)(c) would not pass the standard set by R v A. “Cases such as these should be
the subject of Governor-General’s references to the Court of Appeal, because
they’re miscarriages of justice by which hundreds of people have gone to
jail,” Robertson said. “However, as with any
case, there is always the possibility of defendants bringing new appeals on
the basis of R v A and arguing that
their trials were unfair,” he added. Minister of Justice
Phil Goff told NZ Lawyer, “A
doesn’t recast the application of s 23G, nor does it restrict the evidence
that could be given under section 23G. There is therefore no reason to think
that it will have any effect on other cases where s 23G has applied.” Lynley Hood, If the R v A yardstick were applied to Ellis, most, if not all, of the
‘behavioural characteristics of child sexual abuse’ presented by prosecution
expert witness Dr Karen Zelas in her evidence-in-chief would be considered
irrelevant and of no probative value, Hood said. Zelas did not give
evidence about other possible explanations for the observed behaviours in Ellis, Hood said. When the defence expert
witness, Australian psychologist Dr Keith Le Page, argued that that you
needed to look at the background of the children because other possible
explanations for the observed behaviours should be considered and you
couldn’t say that behaviours were consistent with sexual abuse unless you
looked at all the other factors – “which is exactly what R v A is saying you
should do,” Hood said – he was “attacked” by both the Crown and the Judge for
going outside the provisions of s 23G. When the comments by
the Crown and the Judge in Ellis on
Dr Le Page’s concerns are compared with the Court of Appeal’s comments in R v A on the need to explore other
possible explanations for the observed behaviours in allegedly abused
children, “one is bound to conclude that the jury in Ellis was seriously misled on this point,” Hood said. Optican said “I have
always been suspicious of the database, studies and empirical evidence said
to back up testimony under s 23.” He considered that the section may need a
“rethink” in light of current evidence about behaviours associated with child
sexual abuse and how experts can and should be able to talk about it in
Court. “I would like to see
Parliament, informed by expert opinion and analysis, consider the current
state of expert knowledge that would allow or not allow expert testimony
under s 23G,” Optican said. “If the data is there to support it, Parliament
should tell us clearly in a carefully drafted and properly considered statute
how an expert can present such evidence and what the criteria of
admissibility should be – or repeal the section if it so decides.” Robertson said, “If
evidence is relevant and probative there is no need for legislation admitting
it and there is nothing wrong with the common law on who is an expert. The section
should be repealed.” |