|
New Zealand Law Journal
October, 2003
pages 389-392
In response to Emma Davies and Jeffrey Masson
Felicity Goodyear-Smith, MBCHB FRNZCGP MGP
Felicity Goodyear-Smith, the University of Auckland
responds to criticism of A City Possessed at [2003]
NZLJ 315
Both Hood and the Masson and Davies article rightly agree that “Just how
widespread is child sexual abuse, and just how serious are the consequences?”
are crucial questions.
Hood reviews some of the studies that have assessed these questions, with
wildly varying results. She concludes “All estimates of the prevalence of
child sexual abuse are contaminated by unknown and unknowable levels of
under-reporting and over-reporting” and “child sexual abuse happens. It may
or may not cause lasting harm. The long-term effects are difficult to
determine because traumatic sexual abuse usually occurs in association with
other detrimental childhood factors”. Masson and Davies take issue with her
conclusion that “we don’t know” the true prevalence of child sexual abuse nor
the chance of long-term harm from such abuse.
They refer first to David Finkelhor’s review of prevalence studies (Finkelhor, 1994) which found prevalence rates for
women between 7 per cent and 36 per cent. In fact, this variance high-lights
the problem of estimating how often child sexual abuse (CSA) occurs.
Comparing studies is problematic, because studies use no standard definition
of ‘child’ (may be under the age of 12, 14 or 18) ‘sex’ (for example, some
studies might include a hug or kiss from a relative that a child decided was
‘yukky’, even if the adult’s intent was not sexual) or ‘abuse’ (may involve
only acts of physical contact, or may include non-contact abuse such as
witnessing ‘flashing’ or viewing pornography) and many do not define ‘child
sex abuse’ at all.
Furthermore, use of Finkelhor as an authority on prevalence is surprising.
Finkelhor was lead author of a book on sexual abuse in child care centres (Finkelhor et al, Nursery
Crimes, 1988). This book identifies the major part the Californian
McMartin Preschool case played in ‘uncovering’ other cases of sexual abuse in
day care centres throughout the 1980s, with two-thirds of victims being
ritual-abuse cases. Finkelhor classifies the McMartin case as
“substantiated”, involving more than 300 victimised children and multiple
abusers engaged in systematic ritualistic bizarre abuse of children. In fact,
exhaustive investigations revealed no evidence to substantiate any of the
charges, apart from the testimony of children who had undergone extensive
‘disclosure interviews’. Analysis of the interview videotapes demonstrates
that the repeated highly suggestive questioning, combined with rewards
(stickers, food, praise) for ‘disclosures’ and punishment (calling them liars
or preventing them leaving until they ‘told’) were major contributing factors
in the false reports eventually elicited from the children (Garven et al 1998). A record-breaking $15,000,000
trial eventually resulted in all defendants acquitted.
The McMartin Preschool and the Christchurch Civic Crèche cases have
remarkable parallels. Both started with a child attending the centre
presenting with a problem considered by a parent to be an indicator of sexual
abuse. There followed meetings of anxious parents and intense involvement of
social workers, counsellors and the police. In both cases, none of the
children interviewed made any disclosures of abuse. The children’s denials
were not believed. It was only after weeks of repeated interviews that some
of the children began to talk about abuse, with allegations that became
increasingly extreme and bizarre as interviews progressed. In both cases,
allegations progressed to involving the child care workers subjecting
children to rape, anal, oral and group sex; making children drink urine and
eat faeces; naked circle games; placing children in cages, tunnels or burying
them in boxes, and making child pornography. In both cases a parent or
parents believed that ritualistic cults were operating in the centre. A
parent of one of the key complainants in the Christchurch case requested the
police bring Pamela Hudson, an American ‘satanic ritual abuse’ expert, to New
Zealand to assist in the inquiry (NZPA, Dec 1992),.
She said her son had described incidents involving all sixteen of Hudson’s
“indicators” of satanic abuse, including being suspended in cages,
participating in sacrifices, and ‘circle’ rituals. (McLoughlin,
1996) Extensive investigations of over 12,000 reported accusations of
satanic ritual abuse in the USA (Lanning, 1991), (Goodman et al, 1994) and similar investigations in
Britain (La Fontaine, 1994) have found no
substantiation of the occurrence of such ritualised abuse.
The difference between the McMartin and the Christchurch Crèche cases is that
in the former, all the accused were eventually cleared by the courts of any
abuse.
For prevalence figures, Masson and Davies also rely on Diana Russell’s
findings that “28 per cent of the 940 women reported at least one experience
of sexual abuse within the family before the age of 18”. They describe
Russell’s results and methodology as “compelling”. However this 1978 study of
930 San Francisco women has significant flaws. Subjects were accessed using a
public opinion-poll organisation providing a “probability sample of
households” without the randomisation method being described in the paper. (Russell, 1983) Door-knocking interviewers recorded
a 50 per cent refusal rate. Data are based on retrospective self-reporting of
consenting women during lengthy interviews. Sixteen percent reported
experiences of intrafamilial abuse ranging from “unwanted but non-forceful
kissing” to “forcible rape” under age 18, with 3.7 per cent reporting “very
serious” abuse as described by Masson and Davies. The significant study
weaknesses limit the generalisability of such data to the general New Zealand
public.
Data from David Fergusson’s Christchurch Health and Development study, which
has followed a cohort of over 1000 children born in Christchurch in 1977, is
certainly more reliable and representative information relevant to the New
Zealand population. At age 18, 10.4 per cent of the 1019 subjects reported
unwanted sexual experiences prior to sixteen, ranging from leering and
suggestive comments to intercourse. (Fergusson et
al, 1996). Family members were perpetrators in 23.5 per cent of cases
(2.5 per cent of the cohort).
Masson and Davies use Fergusson’s data to support their claim that Miriam
Saphira’s figures “are not so far from academic figures as Hood’s book would
lead us believe”. The much-publicised Telethon claim “One in four New Zealand
girls are sexually abused before they turn 18. Half of them by their own
father” (Telethon advertisement, 1988) was based
on figures promoted by Miriam Saphira (Saphira, 1981)
However, while Fergusson found that 23.5 per cent of cases were perpetrated
by family members, overwhelming these were not natural parents, who were only
1.5 per cent of perpetrators. Two of the 1019 (<0.2 per cent) were
sexually abused by a natural parent, and seven ( <0.7 per cent) by
step-parents. These data suggest perhaps one in 500 children sexually abused
by a natural father, not the one in eight suggested by the Telethon
advertisement. [Note
A]
Masson and Davies’ analysis on the effects of CSA is similarly problematic.
They claim that “Child sexual abuse has been linked to suicide, depression,
psychiatric admissions, drug abuse and eating disorders”, failing to
appreciate that association does not mean causation. Because two things are associated,
this does not mean that one causes the other. Specifically if there are two
phenomena, ‘A’ and ‘B’, they may be related in four different ways: A is not
associated with B in any way; A causes B; B causes A; or both A and B are
caused (or predisposed to) by some independent factor, C (Pope
& Hudson, 1995)
As an example of the latter, when acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS)
was identified in the 1980s, it was more likely to be found in homosexual men
who used inhaled nitrates. Investigators wondered whether nitrate use caused
AIDS. However subsequent research discovered that AIDS was caused by
infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), and that homosexual
men who used nitrates were also more likely to engaged in certain risky
sexual behaviours (unprotected anal intercourse). The association between
nitrite use (A) and AIDS (B) was therefore not a causal relationship but due
to a confounding factor (C) - specific sexual practices (Vandenbroucke & Pardoel, 1989)
Masson and Davies correctly identify that there is a huge body of literature
“on the sequelae of child sexual abuse”. However very little of this is
rigorously conducted epidemiological research. Many studies have serious
sampling biases and other methodological flaws. This topic has previously
been addressed in the NZLJ (Goodyear-Smith,
1999)
For example, the scientific literature reveals no causal association between
CSA and eating disorders. Neither controlled nor uncontrolled studies of
bulimia nervosa found higher rates of CSA than those found in studies of the
general population using comparable methods. Current evidence does not
support the hypothesis that CSA is a risk factor for bulimia nervosa or other
eating disorders (Pope, 1994); (Pope
& Hudson, 1992); (Vogeltanz-Holm, 2000).
A recent meta-analysis (synthesising and statistical pooling studies)
concluded that CSA did not emerge as one of the possible risk factors for
developing an eating disorder (Stice, 2002)
A meta-analysis of non-clinical population studies concludes that CSA has no
inevitable adverse outcomes. Although most studies show that, on average,
young adults with CSA are less adjusted than their peers, the statistical
explanation is overwhelmingly due, not to the CSA, but to other negative
aspects of their family environment (explaining nine times the amount of
variance than CSA) (Rind & Tromovitch, 1997). In
other words, in most cases psychological problems in adulthood can be
attributed to other confounding adverse factors, not sexual abuse.
This is in line with New Zealand studies. The Otago Women’s Health Survey
Child Sexual Abuse study found that in most cases, negative effects of CSA
could be explained by the family and social context from which it emerged,
although the most severely abused showed an increased risk of psychopathology
even when they came from advantaged backgrounds. The effect
of CSA does appear to be dose-dependant, with increased risk of long-term
sequelae with very severe forms of sexual assault. (Mullen,
1993); (Mullen et al, 1993). Women reporting
CSA did have a higher rate of psychiatric disorders, especially depression,
as adults compared to a non-abused population, but the researchers warn
against “overestimating the contribution of childhood abuse in general, and
sexual abuse in particular, to explaining mental health and interpersonal
difficulties in our community”. They concluded that the contribution of any
form of childhood abuse to the variables they studied (psychopathology,
sexual difficulties, decreased self- esteem or interpersonal problems) was
extremely modest, only 1-5 per cent of the cases. (Mullen,
1996) Those people predominantly came from disadvantaged homes (most
subjects reporting CSA who had developed problems had concomitant histories
of family violence or emotional neglect). In many cases the apparent
association between CSA and adult problems “was accounted for by this matrix
of childhood disadvantage from which abuse so often emerged” (Mullen, 1996).
Fergusson similarly found that those reporting CSA had an increased rate of
depression, anxiety, substance abuse, disturbed behaviour or attempted
suicide than those not reporting sexual abuse, but after adjusting for
the confounding factor of family
dysfunction, a maximum of 10-20 per cent of the risk of psychiatric disorder
in young adults could be accounted for by exposure to CSA (Fergusson et al, 1996)
While Masson and Davies criticise Hood for not using the newest publications
available, they appear similarly selective in the research they quote.
Instead of referring to the more recent meta-analysis (Rind
& Tromovitch, 1997) and findings from the Otago (Mullen,
1996) and Christchurch studies (Fergusson et
al, 1996); (Fergusson et al, 1996), they
rely on a 1993 review. This paper is based on clinical and legal cases with
inherent sample biases and therefore cannot be assumed representative of the
general population (Kendall-Tackett et al,
1993). Again, this reference is the work of Finkelhor and Williams, and
includes child care cases with alleged satanic ritual abuse.
When ascribing causality, the association between the causal experience and
the putative results must be obvious and large. It appears that just as a
history of CSA is not necessary for the development of any particular
psychiatric or adjustment disorder as an adult, only a minority of people
exposed to CSA develop any diagnosable problem (Laidlaw
et al, 2001). CSA is not to be condoned: it is both illegal and morally
repugnant. Fortunately, however, most children are resilient, while a few are
vulnerable and develop a wide range of idiosyncratic and unpredictable
psychological problems. There are no reliable ‘behavioural indicators’ of
CSA.
Masson and Davies berate Hood for challenging Summit’s paper on the process
of disclosure of child sexual abuse, the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome (CSAAS) (Summit, 1983). Summit claimed
that sexually abused children typically exhibited this syndrome, with the
helplessness and secrecy about their abuse resulting in children
‘accommodating’ with delayed, conflicting and unconvincing disclosures and
later retractions.
This led to children’s denial or recanting being considered as evidence of
abuse. A ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ approach, this means that both a
child’s admission and denial prove that abuse has occurred. In 1992 Summit
published that CSAAS was based solely on his clinical impressions not
research-based; that it should not be used in diagnosis; that it was not a
syndrome but rather a pattern he had observed, and it that should not be used
in court. (Summit, 1992) Despite this caveat,
CSAAS was frequently used in courtrooms to explain why children believed to
have been abused would deny it. This includes its implicit use in the
Christchurch Crèche case. Masson and Davies appear unaware that Summit
himself warned against courtroom use of CSAAS.
The ‘recovered memory’ phenomenon was based on the same premises of high
prevalence. Problems in adult women (such as eating disorders, depression,
relationship difficulties to psychosis) were thought likely to have been
caused by CSA. In the late 1980s and 1990s it was believed many women had
‘repressed’ memories of these events and a variety of hypnosis-like
techniques (for example, guided imagery) were used to help women recover
their memories in therapy. A book by Masson lent weight to this theory (Masson, 1984). During the early development of his
‘talking therapy’, Freud wrote that almost all his adult female patients told
him about sexual abuse by their fathers. Freud initially accepted the
veracity of these stories, but later concluded that they were unconscious
fantasies generated under hypnosis. Masson’s book claimed that Freud had
recanted under pressure and that his initial statements regarding incest as
the cause of his clients’ problems were correct. Of course, there is no way
to know which of Freud's patients (none, some or all) were victims of incest
or were victims of pseudo-memories generated through hypnosis. However
Masson's book was used by promoters of recovered memory therapy to support
their theory. The ‘bible’ of the recovered memory movement, the self-help
manual ‘Courage to heal’ (Bass & Davis, 1988)
used Masson’s explanation of how “Freud constructed the Oedipal theory as a
cover-up for the truth of child sexual abuse” to support their views.
‘Courage to heal’ was followed by other books and workshops promulgating
these beliefs.
While Davies may not have made a “public statement on recovered memory”, she,
along with her partner John Read, and colleague Fred Seymour, wrote in
response to a TVNZ programme that most recovered memories “do not occur
within counselling” (Davies, Read & Seymour, 1997).
Davies, Read and Seymour have also published that CSA “occurs with one in
four girls” and give their opinion that the majority of children usually deny
their abuse and will only describe it “over a number of interviews. ..full
disclosure of sexual abuse is frequently a lengthy process, not a one-off
event” (Davies, Read & Seymour, 1996)
In support of ‘recovered memory’ theory, Masson and Davies write “A
well-designed prospective study showed that some sexually abused adults have
periods in their lives when they do not remember being abused” (Williams, 1994). By Linda Williams, co-author with
Finkelhor of publications quoted above, this study is commonly quoted as the
best evidence supporting memory repression of CSA. Of 129 Afro-American women
interviewed about CSA that had been investigated at a hospital emergency room
17 years previously, 38 per cent did not tell the interviewer about the
alleged abuse. However, this study measures ‘not recalling’ rather than
repression. There are many possible explanations for their non-recall other
than repression: the reported abuse happened when they were too young to
remember (over half were aged 0-6 years; 12 per cent under three years old);
simple forgetting; choosing not to talk about the incident; or the original
allegation was false (for a detailed critique see Goodyear-Smith, 1998).
While Masson and Davies appear to adhere to the concept of memory recovery
and repression, there is considerable evidence that many cases emerged within
the context of therapy. There is a huge body of scientific research
demonstrating that false ‘memories’ can be generated through inappropriate
use of hypnosis-like techniques. The dramatic reduction in ‘recovered memory’
cases from the 1990s to the 2000s supports the hypothesis that memory
repression and ‘recovery’ through therapy was a phenomenon generated by these
misguided beliefs and practices.
I agree with Masson and Davies that “a considerable body of experimental
research has shown that young children can provide accurate recall of salient
events” (Ceci & Bruck, 1993). However, there is
also a considerable body of research, particularly by these authors,
demonstrating that children can be led to make false reports they come to
believe are true. Pre-school children are especially vulnerable to effects of
suggestive and repeated questioning (Bruck & Ceci,
1999). They may internalise the false memories and resist debriefing.
“Children's false statements can be convincing to professionals, who are
unable to distinguish between the children's accurate and inaccurate
narratives” (Ceci & Huffman, 1997).
Hood highlights the impact of the Evidence Amendment Act 1989 resulting in
child complainants no longer required to appear in court in person. Masson
and Davies outline their views on why videolink or screening is preferable.
However facing your accuser in the courtroom has been one of the basic tenets
of justice. There is no research to show that abused children are harmed by
viewing the offender guarded in the dock from the safety of the witness box.
Conversely, for non-abused children who are making false reports, seeing the
real person may act as a reality check against the fantasised monster they
have constructed in their heads.
The Christchurch Crèche case was not an isolated aberration. It happened
because of the prevailing belief in a grossly inflated prevalence of CSA,
coupled with a conviction that any behaviour problems in childhood, or
psychological disturbances in adult women, are likely to be caused by CSA.
Lists of wide-ranging ‘behavioural indicators’ of CSA (such as bed-wetting, nightmares,
shyness, tantrums) were extensively promoted by New Zealand social workers,
psychologists and doctors specialising in CSA in the 1980s and 1990s. Common
teaching was that children are usually too scared to tell about CSA and may
only disclose within the safety of an interview. Once suspicion of abuse had
been aroused, children might be questioned many times, both informally by
parents and formally by interviewers, before any allegations emerged. Both
professionals and parents were instructed to always believe a child and
praise them for telling about abuse. It was not acceptable to challenge a
child on the veracity of a claim, no matter how improbable or even impossible
it was that an alleged event could have occurred.
Masson and Davies are correct that estimates of the prevalence and effects of
CSA are pivotal influences in the Crèche case. Hood has accurately identified
that gross inflation of the extent and effects of CSA was a driving force in
this case. Masson and Davies accuse Hood of minimising these figures; however
the references they use to shore up this accusation are seriously flawed.
Challenging exaggerated statistics is not a denial of the reality of CSA and
its potential harm. We all agree that CSA occurs; it is illegal and reprehensible,
and that sufferers may develop subsequent psychological problems on occasion.
While Masson and Davies state “we cannot comment on the guilt or innocence of
Peter Ellis”, Davies previously has not been so reluctant. In 1997 she stated
in a press release complaining about a television programme on the Ellis case
“One can only wonder what profound effect this biased programme has had on
the families of the children abused by Ellis”, clearly expressing her view
that Ellis is guilty (Davies, 1997)
Advocacy for the victim is another key element in promoting false reports. In
the 1990s social workers, evidential interviewers, forensic doctors and the
police were taught they must treat every sexual allegation as genuine. They
should minimise distressing a complainant by avoiding critical examination of
her testimony (Goodyear-Smith, 1996). A
belief that false allegations do not occur, and that the role of a Crown
expert witness is to be advocate for complainant, deemed ‘victim’ prior to
the trial, is inconsistent with the impartiality demanded by the forensic
role. However, the manual for doctors performing forensic CSA examinations
instructed them to act as advocate for the child (Fancourt et al, 1994)
This perspective persists in the 2000s. Expert witness advocacy by Dr Zelas,
key Crown psychiatric witness in the Crèche case, recently resulted in the
Appeal Court quashing multiple child sex assault convictions (NZ Appeal Court, 2003).
The faulty assumptions underpinning investigation of sexual abuse cases and
the systemic errors consequential to this, have resulted in cases of
injustice not limited to the Christchurch Crèche case. This is why a Royal
Commission of Inquiry is essential.
References
Bass E, Davis L. The Courage to heal: a guide for women
survivors of sexual abuse. New York: Harper and Row; 1988
Bruck M, Ceci S. The suggestibility of children's
memory. Annual Review of Psychology 1999;50:419-439
Ceci S, Bruck M. Suggestibility of the child witness: A
historical review and synthesis. Psychological Bulletin 1993;113:403-439
Ceci S, Huffman M. How suggestible are preschool
children? Cognitive and social factors. Journal of the American Academy of
Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 1997;36:948-958
Davies E, Read J, Seymour, F (Psychology Department,
Auckland University) Letter to the Editor, North & South, Oct 1996
Davies E, Read J, Seymour, F (Psychology Department,
Auckland University) Letter to the Editor, Listener, 5 Apr 1997, p12
Davies, Emma, Researcher in Psychology and Law,
University of Auckland and Spokesperson for the Children's Agenda. Press
Release, Child Advocacy Trust 20 Nov 1997
Fancourt R, Shand C, Broadmore J, Milford R. The
medical management of sexual abuse. 4th ed. Wellington: Doctors for Sexual
Abuse Care; 1994, p82
Fergusson D, Lynskey M, Horwood L. Childhood sexual
abuse and psychiatric disorder in young adulthood: I. Prevalence of sexual
abuse and factors associated with sexual abuse. Journal of American Academy
of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 1996;35:1355-1364
Fergusson DM, Horwood LJ, Lynskey MT. Childhood
sexual abuse and psychiatric disorder in young adulthood: II. Psychiatric outcomes
of childhood sexual abuse. Journal of American Academy of Child &
Adolescent Psychiatry 1996;35:1365-1374
Finkelhor D, Williams L, Burns N. Nursery crimes:
sexual abuse in day care. Newbury Park: Sage Publications; 1988.
Finkelhor D. The international epidemiology of
child sexual abuse. Child Abuse & Neglect. 1994;18:409-17
Garven S, Wood JM, Malpass RS, Shaw JS, 3rd. More than
suggestion: the effect of interviewing techniques from the McMartin Preschool
case. Journal of Applied Psychology. 1998;83:347-59
Goodman G, Qin J, Bottoms B, Shaver P. Characteristics
and sources of allegations of ritualistic satanic abuse, Report to the
National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect. Washington DC; 1994
Goodyear-Smith F. Victim-orientated law reforms:
advantages and pitfalls. Issues in Child Abuse Accusations 1996;8:87-93
Goodyear-Smith FA, Laidlaw TM, Large RG. In
praise of scholarship: A reply to McCullough. Health Care Analysis 1998;
6:223-226
Goodyear-Smith F. Childhood sexual abuse and
mental health. NZ Law Journal 1999;October:386-388
Kendall-Tackett KA, Williams LM, Finkelhor D.
Impact of sexual abuse on children: A review and synthesis of recent
empirical studies. Psychological Bulletin 1993;113:164-180
La Fontaine J. The extent and nature of organised
and ritual abuse. London: HMSO; 1994
Laidlaw T, Goodyear-Smith F, Gorman D. Sexual abuse
counselling: what is the rationale?, Nuance 2001;2: 64-86
Lanning K. Ritual abuse; a law enforcement view or
perspective. Child Abuse and Neglect 1991;15:171-5
Masson J. Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the
Seduction Theory, Penguin Books; 1984
McLoughlin, D (Aug 1996). ‘Second thoughts on the
Christchurch Civic Crèche case: has justice failed Peter Ellis?’, North &
South, 55-69
Mullen PE. Child sexual abuse and adult mental health:
The development of disorder. Journal Interpersonal Violence 1993;8:429-432
Mullen et al. Childhood sexual abuse and mental health
in adult life. British Journal of Psychiatry 1993;163:721-732
Mullen PE et al. The long-term impact of the physical,
emotional, and sexual abuse of children: A community study. Child Abuse &
Neglect 1996;20:7-21
NZ Appeal Court, CA 051/03, 25 Jun 2003, Anderson,
Panckhurst, Patterson JJ
NZPA, Mother tells court of plea for expert’s help, NZ
Herald, 4 Dec 1992
Pope HG, Jr., Hudson JI. Is childhood sexual abuse a risk
factor for bulimia nervosa? American Journal of Psychiatry. 1992;149:455-63
Pope HG, Jr et al. Childhood sexual abuse and bulimia
nervosa: a comparison of American, Austrian, and Brazilian women. American
Journal of Psychiatry. 1994; 151:732-7
Pope HG, Hudson JI. Does childhood sexual abuse cause
adult psychiatric disorders? Essentials of methodology. Journal of Psychiatry
& Law 1995; 23:363-381
Rind B, Tromovitch P. A meta-analytic review of findings
from national samples on psychological correlates of child sexual abuse.
Journal of Sex Research 1997;34:237-255
Russell D. The incidence and prevalence of
intrafamilial sexual abuse of female children. Child Abuse and Neglect 1983;7:133-176
Saphira M. The sexual abuse of children. Auckland:
Papers Inc; 1981
Stice E. Risk and maintenance factors for eating
pathology: a meta-analytic review. Psychological Bulletin. 2002;128:825-48
Summit R. The child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.
Child Abuse & Neglect 1983;7:177-193
Summit R. Abuse of the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome. Journal of Child Sexual Abuse 1992;1:153-163
Telethon advertisement, ‘It’s not the dark she’s
afraid of’, Auckland Sun, 18 Jun 1988, p27
Vandenbroucke JP, Pardoel VP. An autopsy of
epidemiologic methods: the case of "poppers" in the early epidemic
of the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). American Journal of
Epidemiology. 1989;129:455-7
Vogeltanz-Holm N et al. Longitudinal predictors
of binge eating, intense dieting, and weight concerns in a national sample of
women. Behavior Therapy 2000;31:221-235
Williams L. Recall of childhood trauma: A prospective
study of women's memories of child sexual abuse. Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology 1994;62:1167-1176
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
[Note A]. 21
October 2003
The NZ Law Journal paper incorrectly stated "not the one in two
suggested by the Telethon advertisement"
This error has been corrected at the request of the author, Felicity
Goodyear-Smith
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
