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Ministry
of Justice
October 17, 2003
Petition of Lynley Jane Hood and Don Brash
and 807 others
The Peter Ellis case
Ministry of Justice comments on the
submission made by the petitioners
Table of Contents
Covering Letter
Introduction
Miscarriages of Justice - Independent
Appraisal
The exercise of the Royal
prerogative of mercy
The Ministry's role
Experience since 1995
Consideration of the Ellis case
The Petitioners' submission
Issues of the Petitioners
submission
The Wider Issues
Terms of Reference
Need for Inquiry
What are the options?
Petitioners raise matters pointing
to a miscarriage of justice
Government initiates inquiry
Covering Letter
Ministry of
Justice
17 October 2003
Mr Tim Barnett
Chair
Justice and Electoral Committee
Parliament House
Wellington 1
Dear Mr Barnett,
Petition
of Lynley Jane Hood and Don Brash and 807 others
On 17 September 2003, the Justice and Electoral Committee
asked the Ministry of Justice to comment on the submission made by the
petitioners in relation to the above-mentioned petition. It was subsequently
agreed with the clerk of the Committee that the timeframe for providing
comment be extended to 17 October 2003.
Please find the Ministry's comments attached as requested.
Please do not hesitate to contact Melanie Gudsell or myself if you require
any further assistance.
Yours sincerely
Val Sim
Chief Legal Counsel
Office of Legal Counsel
DDI: +64-4-494 9755
FAX: +64-4-494 9839
Introduction
The main arguments in the submission appear to be:
·
That there are good reasons for believing that the justice system has
failed in the Ellis case; and
·
The appropriate mechanism for putting the matter right is a Royal
Commission of Inquiry.
The essence of the petitioner's concern is concisely
expressed on page 3 of the submission:
(a)
"That in the Christchurch Civic Creche case the justice system
failed, and failed catastrophically at many levels, and has been unable to
self-correct. (our emphasis)
………………………
(g)
That the proper constitutional mechanism by which the creche case may
be fully examined, and public confidence restored, is a Royal Commission of
Inquiry.
(h)
That until the concerns raised by the Creche case are resolved in a
manner acceptable to most New Zealanders they will not go away."
The petition urges that the degree of public and
professional concern exhibited about the case demands a Royal Commission of
Inquiry. The substance of the petition concentrates on the range of matters
that the petitioners submit should give grounds for concern and which now
require a full and independent examination. However, it is also central to
the submission that if matters have or may have gone wrong, existing
processes for dealing with miscarriages of justice cannot be relied on to put
matters right because the Minister of Justice and officials advising him have
a "vested interest" in the outcome.
We address this aspect of the submission first as it involves an apparent
misunderstanding of the role of the Ministry of Justice and is not borne out
by the facts.
Miscarriages
Of Justice - Independent Appraisal
The theme that runs through the submission is that there
is an in-built resistance within Government to proper re-examination of the
safety of Mr Ellis' convictions. For instance:
·
At paragraph 75 of the submission, a suggested term of reference is
§
"whether the Minister of Justice has abdicated his responsibility
to address the concerns raised by the creche case."
·
At paragraph 82(b)(ii), concerning proposed administrative
arrangements for a Royal Commission, it is stated:
§
"To ensure that witnesses are not intimidated, and the Commission
is not undermined by public servants with vested interests, provision should
be made for Commissioners to bring their own administrative staff."
·
At paragraph 83, concerning advice provided to the Minister of Justice
on the Ellis case over the last decade, it is stated:
§
"These advisers [Ministry of Justice, Crown Law Office] have a
vested interest in not having a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the creche
case. Consequently, instead of being part of the solution, these advisers may
be part of the problem."
We make the following comments.
(i)
Ministry of Justice officials considering applications for the
exercise of the Royal prerogative have a vested interest in protecting the
decisions reached by the courts from proper inquiry;
(j)
The official consideration that has already been given to Mr Ellis'
case cannot for that reason be relied on;
(k)
Any further consideration of the safety of Mr Ellis' conviction could
only reliably be undertaken by a person or body independent of officials.
We make the following comments.
The exercise of the Royal prerogative of mercy
The Ministry's role
The system for considering possible miscarriages is quite
separate from the criminal justice process and independent in fact. The
responsibility for advising the Governor-General on applications for the
exercise of the Royal prerogative of mercy lies with the Minister of Justice
who in turn seeks advice from officials in the Ministry of Justice. The
Minister and his officials have neither a responsibility for the conduct of
criminal prosecutions nor a brief to defend the decisions of the courts from
proper scrutiny.
It is important to be clear that when the Ministry considers a possible
miscarriage of justice it is not an advocate for any "side". The
Ministry's role is to examine whether there is, on the evidence available and
the submissions made, good reason to recommend that a person's case be
re-opened. In doing so, the Ministry applies the conventions and principles
discussed in Appendix 2 of the Ministry's earlier submission on this
petition.
In undertaking its role, the Ministry stands apart from the applicant, the
Police and the Crown prosecutors. The Ministry's process is careful,
deliberative, and in major cases (like the Ellis case) painstaking. The
Ministry may gather information from any of the parties, and frequently does,
and it may consult the parties on aspects of the application. However, the
assessment of the applicant's case and the formal advice that is tendered to
the Minister is entirely independent of the parties. This independence is mirrored at
ministerial level, where it is the Minister of Justice (rather than the
Attorney -General) who provides advice to the Governor-General. The Minister advises the Governor-General
directly and does not require or seek Cabinet approval.
The Ministry's fundamental concern in every case it considers is to determine
where the interests of justice lie. This recognises that the public is
equally interested in seeing miscarriages of justice corrected and in seeing
convictions that that are soundly based being upheld.
Experience since 1995
Recent experience demonstrates that the examination of
possible miscarriages of justices is even-handed and concerned only with the
interests of justice. From 1995 to February 2003, consideration of 56
applications for the Royal prerogative of mercy was completed. In 10 of those cases (18%), the applicant
obtained some relief. 8 cases were referred back to the courts (including
Ellis). One case (Ellis, again) received a second referral expanding the
terms of reference for the Court of Appeal to consider. And one case (Bain)
was referred to the Court of Appeal for an opinion. The Bain case has since
been sent back to the Court for a full hearing.
Where necessary, the Ministry engages experienced Queens Counsel and retired
judges in cases of complexity or major importance. There have been 7
occasions since 1995 where either a QC or a retired judge has been briefed to
assist with the assessment of a Royal prerogative application. Counsel with
experience both as prosecutors and as defence counsel have been briefed. The
role performed by the independent counsel usually falls into one of the
following categories:
·
Counsel is briefed at the outset to fully assess the application and
provide a report to the Ministry, which is then tendered to the Minister of
Justice;
·
Counsel is asked to provide peer review of the Ministry's work, which
is then taken into account in finalising advice to the Minister;
·
After the Ministry has conducted its own assessment, counsel is
briefed to fully assess the application and provide a formal second opinion,
which is then tendered to the Minister.
The appointment of senior counsel in these circumstances
demonstrates a concern to underline the assurance of independent, quality
advice.
Consideration of the Ellis case
Finally, it may be worth recapping on the consideration
that successive applications by Mr Ellis for the Royal prerogative of mercy
have received.
The petitioner's submission correctly records that appeals for a Royal
Commission of Inquiry in the initial years after Ellis was convicted were
rejected by the Government. The primary reason was that the central issue in
the appeals made to Government was always the question of the safety of his
conviction. The Royal prerogative of mercy is the recognised process for
dealing with such questions when legal remedies have been exhausted, and it
was to this process that Mr Ellis and his supporters were referred. Looking
at the treatment of Mr Ellis' applications for the Royal prerogative shows
that he has received favourable consideration.
·
The first application in 1997 resulted not in a pardon but in referral
of his conviction back to the Court of Appeal, with specific reference to
certain matters;
·
The second application in 1998 was referred to Sir Thomas Thorp for
consideration and resulted in a further Order in Council expanding the terms
of reference for the Court of Appeal hearing.
·
A third application in 1999, following the Court of Appeal's decision,
resulted in the establishment of the inquiry conducted by Sir Thomas
Eichelbaum regarding the children's evidence.
The purpose of setting this out is not to suggest that Mr
Ellis has had all the justice he deserves. It is simply to illustrate that
the system of examining miscarriages of justice, and the officials who
sustain it, can be relied on to take these matters as seriously as the public
has a right to expect, without fear or favour, and with the ultimate concern
of advancing the interests of justice.
Indeed, the Ministry's position (as indicated in paragraph 109 of our earlier
submission) is that the door must always be open to the consideration of any
material that can be brought forward that has not been "fully and
properly examined and which could have a material outcome on the case."
That is a convenient point at which to turn to the substance of the
petitioner's submission.
The
Petitioners' Submission
Issues of the Petitioners submission
The petitioner's submission sets out a list of
"questions raised by the Creche case that warrant full and independent
examination". The following section considers the issues set out in
paragraphs 52 to 69 of the petitioners' submission and sets out the extent to
which each issue has already been considered.
Whether the
availability of ACC lump sum compensation for sexual abuse encouraged parents
to lay complaints against the creche staff.
The fact that parents of children had applied for ACC
compensation was well known at the time of the trial. There was no evidence
adduced at trial, or later in the process, that parents encouraged their
children to make complaints because of the availability of ACC compensation.
Whether the beliefs
(about men, pornography, sexual abuse and heterosexuality) held by some
therapists and interviewers, and the beliefs (about God, Satan, pornography
and homosexuality) held by some police officers, compromised their
objectivity and detachment.
Detective Eade and the interviewers of the children gave
evidence at trial and were cross-examined. While they were not specifically
questioned about their beliefs on the matters specified in the petitioners'
submission, the jury did have the opportunity of hearing their evidence and
came to its own conclusions about the credibility of those involved.
Detective Eade was cross-examined about his role in the investigation. Both
he and the parents were also cross-examined about the nature of the contact
between them. Concerns about Detective Eade's role were raised in a 20/20
documentary in November 1997. As a result, an internal police inquiry was
carried out to consider the issues raised. That investigation considered
questions about Detective Eade's character, mental health and conduct and
concluded that although it was clear that Detective Eade was suffering from
stress as a result of the Ellis case, there was nothing to suggest that any
of these matters had affected the outcome of the case.
The Ministry of Justice and Sir Thomas Thorp also considered the conduct of
Detective Eade in the context of the Royal prerogative of mercy and whether
it warranted referral to the Court of Appeal. Both concluded that it did not,
because the quality of the evidence collected (which was referred back) was
of more importance than the conduct of Detective Eade.
The specialist interviewers were also cross-examined at trial and their
attitudes and conduct were considered by the Court of Appeal following a
submission that "they were working under an agenda with the object of
obtaining disclosure of abuse in the belief that it had occurred". The
Court of Appeal rejected this argument.
Whether an officer
of the rank of Detective should have been in charge of a multiple victim case
involving serious criminal allegations, important legal and policy questions
and major budgetary issues.
Concerns about Detective Eade’s role were considered as
part of the internal police inquiry referred to above. That report concluded
that Eade had the benefit of direct day-to-day supervision of experienced
non-commissioned officers and that, at all times, there were senior
commissioned officers available to assist with the investigation. In
addition, Eade had continual support from health and Social Welfare
professionals and the Crown solicitor.
Whether
irresponsible media coverage inflamed an already volatile situation.
Whether or not media coverage could have affected Ellis'
right to a fair trial was considered by the trial Judge prior to the trial.
The defence submitted that the combination of sensational media reports and
widespread emotional community reaction had severely restricted Ellis'
opportunity of a fair trial.
Williamson J dealt with that application in his Oral Judgement (No 4). He
concluded that most of the publicity about the discharge of the four women
crèche workers was disparaging of the Crown evidence and had suggested that
the evidence of the children was unreliable. In that respect, he considered
that the publicity would probably have assisted Ellis' case. Williamson J
considered the argument that emotions in the community were so strong so as
to prevent a fair trial, but found that this had to be balanced with
widespread public knowledge of unsuccessful prosecutions or inquiries
overseas which resulted from hysteria or the actions of hyper vigilant
parents.
Williamson J noted that a direction would have to be given to the jury at the
commencement of the trial but that other high profile cases had proven that
juries had the capacity to put aside anything they had previously seen and
heard.
Mr Ellis did not appeal this ruling.
Whether networking
between police, interviewers, counsellors and parents, parental questioning
of children, and leading and oppressive specialist interviewing, contaminated
the children's evidence.
The question of the reliability of the children's evidence
as a result of networking and/or interviewing is the central issue in the
Ellis case and was the subject of extensive scrutiny in the course of the
criminal trial processes. As outlined in our original submission, questions
relating to the adequacy of the investigation and the way in which the
interview process was conducted were raised as arguments in support of a
discharge at the depositions hearing, as arguments for his acquittal at trial
and as arguments for a new trial at the Court of Appeal. The issue was also
at the heart of the terms of reference for the Eichelbaum Inquiry.
Whether the basic
civil rights of the creche workers were violated.
No evidence has ever been adduced regarding any violation
of the civil rights of the creche workers. However, the law provides a
variety of civil remedies for those whose rights have been violated,
including the ability to make a complaint to the Police Complaints Authority,
the right to take civil action for a breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act 1990 and the ability to sue for malicious prosecution.
Whether the
children's evidence was credible.
As we have previously stated, the credibility of the
children's evidence was the core issue during the Ellis trial, throughout
consideration of the case by the Court of Appeal on two occasions and as the
focus of the Eichelbaum Inquiry.
During the trial, the jury was in the best position to
judge the credibility of the child complainants. Not only did the jury view
the interview tapes, they also heard the children give evidence and watched
them being cross-examined.
The assessment of the credibility of complainants and/or witnesses is
essentially a matter for the jury, but the law does provide a mechanism so
that if a verdict can be shown to be unreasonable and against the weight of
the evidence, the evidence can be set aside. This argument was made by Mr
Ellis in the Court of Appeal in relation to the credibility of the children
and was rejected.
Sir Thomas Eichelbaum (and the two international experts whose opinions he
sought) viewed all the videotaped interviews of the children and assessed
that evidence against the backdrop of the other evidence given at the
depositions and trial. Sir Thomas had no concerns about the credibility of
the children's evidence.
Whether, in view of
the layout of the creche and the way that it functioned, the offences could
possibly have happened.
The layout and the functioning of the creche was the
subject of evidence considered at both depositions and trial. During the
trial, the jury was taken on a site visit of the creche and saw the layout
first hand. When cross-examined, Mr Ellis himself admitted that there was
opportunity for the events in the toilets to have occurred and there was also
unchallenged evidence that Mr Ellis took children on visits away from the
creche unsupervised. In addition, a number of charges related to times when
Mr Ellis was babysitting children (outside of his creche responsibilities).
This issue was also considered at the Court of Appeal in the context of the
argument that the children's evidence was improbable when considered against
independent evidence of place and circumstances in which the conduct was
alleged to have occurred. The Court of Appeal was not persuaded by arguments
that the design and operation of the creche meant that the abuse could not
have occurred there and was equally unconvinced by arguments about the lack
of opportunity away from the creche when the children were taken on outings.
Whether there was
any rational or legal justification for:
(a) Calling two mass
meetings of creche parents.
(b) Encouraging parents to
send their children for formal interviews.
(c) Encouraging parents to
apply for ACC compensation.
(d) Encouraging parents to
put themselves and their children into therapy.
(e) Establishing support
groups for parents and extended families.
(f) Closing the creche.
(g) Arresting Peter Ellis
and his four colleagues.
Issues (a) - (e) focus essentially on the police
investigation and the process of interviewing the children. The way in which
the case unfolded was the subject of extensive evidence at both depositions
and trial. Further, the essence of the Court of Appeal's consideration of the
case on two separate occasions was whether there was anything about the investigation
and the interview process which would render Mr Ellis' convictions unsafe.
The issue of the closure of the creche and the implications for the creche
staff were dealt with comprehensively by the Employment Court and subsequently, the
Court of Appeal.
There has been consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence to charge Mr
Ellis and the women creche workers. At the conclusion of the depositions
hearing, the presiding district court judge was required to consider whether
there was sufficient evidence to commit each defendant for trial and in this
case the judge issued a written decision. Following committal for trial, Mr
Ellis made a number of applications for discharge, both prior to and during
the trial. In the case of the four women creche workers, this question was
relevant lo the Court's consideration of whether costs should be awarded
following their discharge. It would have been open to the judge to award
costs if he considered that the charging of the women creche workers had been
unreasonable.
Whether Peter
Ellis's trial and appeals met minimum standards of fairness and due process.
The Ellis trial followed ordinary criminal trial processes
and no evidence has been adduced at any stage to indicate that Mr Ellis was
not accorded proper due process. In the event that it can be shown that due
process was not followed, this could constitute a ground for appeal. In the
civil context, action could be taken for a breach of the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990.
Whether a
Ministerial Inquiry was the appropriate forum for an issue as complex and
controversial as the creche case.
Whether the terms of
reference for the Ministerial Inquiry were too narrow.
Whether the Ministerial
Inquiry was conducted according to the rules of natural justice.
Whether the
conclusions of the Ministerial Inquiry were supported by the evidence.
As the most recent inquiry into the Christchurch Civic
Creche case, the Ministerial Inquiry carried out by Sir Thomas Eichelbaum has
not itself been the subject of any further inquiry.
The Ministerial Inquiry was not set up to be a general review of the case. It
was intended to address specific areas of concern that might not have been
seen to have been fully resolved by the Court of Appeal. The focus of the
terms of reference was on issues associated with best practice in
interviewing children and any risks with failing to adhere to that best
practice.
The terms of reference for the Inquiry required Sir Thomas to take the
evidence given at both the depositions and the trial as the factual basis on
which his inquiry proceeded. As a result, he was neither authorised nor
required to interview Mr Ellis, the parents, the children or the creche
workers. Those parties were, however,
provided with the opportunity to comment on the matters that were within the
terms of Sir Thomas' reference. In particular:
ð
the interested parties were consulted about the interpretation of the
terms of reference;
ð
they had the opportunity to make submissions both about the
appointment of experts and about the substantive issues that Sir Thomas was
asked to consider;
ð
they were supplied with the experts' reports and were given the
opportunity to comment; and
ð
throughout, Mr Ellis was represented by Queens'
Counsel who made extensive submissions on his behalf.
It was open to any party to the Inquiry to seek a judicial
review on grounds of breach of natural justice, but none did so.
Whether Peter
Ellis's conviction is unsafe.
Whether Peter Ellis
should be pardoned.
The question of whether Mr Ellis’ convictions were unsafe
and whether he ought to be granted a pardon was the subject of extensive
consideration by the Courts, by the Executive and by the Ministerial Inquiry.
Our earlier submission sets out the detail of the consideration given to this
question at each stage of the process.
Whether the Christchurch City Council decision to -withhold key
evidence in the Employment Court
case taken by the creche workers against their employer caused a miscarriage
of justice.
The Ministry of Justice is not aware of any evidence which
was withheld by the Christchurch City Council during the Employment Court case. The law provides
a right of rehearing where it is established that relevant and significant
evidence has been withheld.
Whether all the
creche staff should be compensated.
The question of compensation for loss of employment was
considered by both the Employment
Court and the Court of Appeal.
The Ministry of Justice would be happy to provide more
detail about the processes and/or the consideration given to the issues set
out above, should the Committee wish.
The wider issues
Paragraphs 70-74 mention a number of more general policy and
operational matters that the petitioners think should be examined. These
concern the state of the law, Police practices, and a range of government
policies and practices relating to the handling of sexual abuse. If there was
a finding in the Ellis case that a miscarriage of justice had occurred, it
might well be necessary to give further consideration to particular policy or
operational matters that were found to have contributed to the miscarriage.
However, we have not reached that point.
The essence of the petition is that what happened in the Christchurch Civic
Creche case amounted to a miscarriage of Justice. The immediate question is
whether any steps should be taken to look into this further and if so what
those steps should he.
Therefore, our view is that consideration of whether any of the "wider
issues" should be pursued further is premature.
Terms of Reference
We have no comment at this stage on the proposed terms of
reference. The first, and hardest, question is whether there should be an
inquiry and what its purpose would be. Only if there were a decision in the
affirmative would it be feasible to then fashion appropriate terms of
reference. We agree with the petitioners (at paragraph 11 of their
submission) that they would need to be drafted with considerable care.
Need for
Inquiry
The petition has aroused considerable public interest. It
is supported by many well-known and reputable public figures. Some sections of
the media have taken a strong editorial position in favour of further
inquiry. There is certainly a level of disquiet amongst some sections of the
general public.
These are not the only views. However, it is clearly one of the main planks
of the petition that the strength of this public and professional concern
about the Creche case is such that the case should be opened up to further,
extensive inquiry.
Over the course of the last 10 years, the Ellis case has been addressed on
the basis that if there are matters of substance that could point to a
possible miscarriage of justice, there are processes available by which these
matters can be examined. As outlined elsewhere, these issues have been gone
into extensively and on several occasions. The issue of most concern (the
reliability and credibility of the children's evidence) is the one that has
received most scrutiny. Normally this would be the end of the matter unless
something of substance subsequently came to light that cast a real doubt over
the conclusions reached by the courts or other properly constituted
authorities.
The Ministry acknowledges that the petitioners are in a sense challenging
this orthodoxy. They seem to be saying that the case has gone wrong from
beginning to end, and that the conclusions reached by the courts and other
inquiries are all part of the overall problem. Only by stepping back from the
whole case and its history and having a fresh look can a balanced appraisal
be achieved. The petitioners' case is that there is strong support for this
viewpoint, from the public generally and from reputable public figures who
have signed the petition.
Therefore, a central issue facing the select committee, and ultimately the
Government, is this:
What weight should be given to evidence of strong public
concern about a matter like the Ellis case that has already been the subject
of extensive consideration, and where the petition does not contain any new
information?
The Ministry has found it very difficult to address this
aspect of the petition.
·
Is it enough that people are concerned?
·
Is something else required to justify further inquiry?
·
If the conclusions of courts and other authorities that have already
scrutinized the case are to be discounted, what is a satisfactory basis for
doing so?
·
Where do the interests of justice lie?
What are the Options?
If this case is to receive further consideration or
inquiry, there are essentially two ways that might occur.
1. Petitioners or Mr Ellis
raise matters pointing to a miscarriage of justice
This is a conventional response. It acknowledges that
matters determined by the criminal justice system may be re-opened if the
applicant can show that there are matters of substance that raise the
possibility of a miscarriage of justice, that this process has in fact
occurred in the Ellis case, and accords respect to the conclusions reached by
the courts and others that have reviewed the case. On this approach, further
inquiry may be justified, but the onus is on an applicant to produce material
that warrants such inquiry, in particular material that is relevant, cogent,
and has not already been properly examined or reviewed.
2. Government initiates
inquiry
The Government could consider initiating a further inquiry
into the case, in the absence of new material of the kind mentioned above.
While there is no legal bar to the Government taking such a course of action,
this would be a major departure given the extent of scrutiny that has already
been given to the case.
We consider that the following matters, amongst others,
should be carefully weighed in the balance in considering whether or not it
is appropriate to proceed in this way.
(a) That there is a branch of public opinion that remains
concerned about the handling and the outcome of the Ellis case.
(b) That there is not a consensus amongst the public or
professionals. There are other strongly held opinions that justice has been
done and thoroughly tested.
(c) That members of the public on all sides of the case have not had
the opportunity to examine the issues to the same extent as the courts and
other authorities that have inquired into the case. The only people who have
had the opportunity to assess the credibility of all of the witnesses are (he
jury.
(d) That the public has a legitimate interest in a system of
justice that not only corrects miscarriages of justice but also upholds
soundly based convictions. Finality is an important though not absolute
value.
(e) The interests of all persons who would be vitally affected by
a decision to establish an inquiry. As well as the creche workers and their
families, they include all the professionals caught up in the case, and not
least the complainant children and their families, whose views have been
given much less public attention.
(f) Whether there are matters that have not been adequately
resolved, that are material to the outcome of the Ellis case, and that are
susceptible to inquiry.
(g) The availability and suitability of other mechanisms to
address issues of concern (such as the right to seek a rehearing in the case
of Employment Court issues, the right of appeal to the Privy Council,
remedies in the courts for civil wrongs or breaches of the Bill of Rights
Act, the Royal prerogative of mercy).
(h) Whether an inquiry conducted in 2003-2004 could be expected
to reach a better view of the facts than was achieved in 1993, given the
effect of the lapse of time on the availability and quality of evidence.
There are particular difficulties about whether the children would be
required to give evidence again or whether a factual inquiry without their
accounts would be fair and comprehensive.
(i) Whether an inquiry conducted in 2003-2004 could be expected
to achieve a genuine resolution of public differences of opinion about the
case, given the polarised and entrenched views that have developed.
These are all important considerations though by no means
an exhaustive list of factors that might be taken into account. There is a
judgement to be made on the value and weight to be assigned to particular
factors and where the overall balance lies. The expression of public concern
that the petition represents is a part of the mix, but in the Ministry's view
should not be seen as the determining factor.
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