Allegations of Abuse in Institutions


St John of God - Marylands - Index


2006/2 - Moloney & Garchow; Federal Court Appeal

 




NZ Lawyer
Issue 39
May 5 2006

 

Australian criticism of NZ sex cases ‘justified’
by Andrea Milner

While a recent Federal Court of Australia decision to block the extradition of two Catholic clergymen to New Zealand to face trial for alleged historical sex crimes has sparked outcry from defenders of local criminal law and procedure, other commentators have concluded that the decision is sadly justified.

In Moloney v New Zealand [2006] FCA 438, Justice Rodney Madgwick held it would be difficult for the Christchurch St John of God Brothers to receive a fair trial due to differences between the legal systems in Australia and New Zealand.

“No longer do sex offenders have to hide out in some third-world country to avoid extradition,” said Denise Arnold, legal adviser for ECPAT NZ, an organisation committed to ending sexual exploitation of children. “Escape is as close as Australia. Is the Australian public prepared to become a haven for paedophiles and sex offenders from New Zealand and other countries?”

“The complainants are entitled to have the charges heard, and the defendants are entitled to justice in the country in which the alleged crime is said to have taken place.”

However, Bernard Robertson, editor of The New Zealand Law Journal, said Justice Madgwick acknowledged that it was exceptional to find it would be “oppressive and unjust” to refuse extradition to a friendly country with a similar legal system, and required the accused to discharge a heavy evidential burden.

“When a respected judicial neighbour not only recognises problems likely to give rise to unsafe trials, but is reluctantly driven to criticise the way New Zealand conducts its trials, then alarm bells should be ringing loudly,” Judith Ablett-Kerr QC said.

The Judge found various circumstances about the case meant the Brothers could not receive a fair trial by Australian standards, given that delays, and the loss of potential witnesses and documents, had resulted in serious presumptive, and actual, prejudice to them.

Ablett-Kerr QC said the decision criticises the New Zealand approach to several procedural and evidential matters which, in the view of that Court, are likely to increase the probability of an accused person in New Zealand not receiving a fair trial, including representative charging, multiple-count charging, similar fact evidence, “dubious investigative and interviewing processes”, and “the dangers associated with mass allegation cases, including concoction or unconscious contamination of complainant testimony.”

Associate Dean of Auckland University’s law faculty Professor Scott Optican said the Australian judge was taking procedural differences between the two countries and wrongly ratcheting them up to a claim of unjustness or oppressiveness.

Justice Madgwick noted the sheer number of complainants making allegations against Brother Maloney indicated that if the charges were tried together, convictions were overwhelmingly likely, despite any strong warnings issued by the trial judge to the jury. “If he were tried in a joint trial with Brother McGrath, in which the latter will face allegations from a number of complainants, that very high likelihood will be converted into a practical certainty,” His Honour concluded.

“Joint trials would likely be regarded as unjust in Australia and not occur.”

Justice Madgwick concluded that even if the applicants were, contrary to the New Zealand prosecuting authorities’ intentions, tried separately in relation to each charge, there was “very likely to be a high degree of unfairness to the applicants through being handicapped in preparing their defences by the long delays in the allegations not being brought to their notice until 2003, between 22 and 31 years later”.

A period of delay of 20 years accounts for the reluctance of abused teenagers to come forward until in their 30s, the Judge explained, but thereafter becomes more questionable.

New Zealand courts are not required to give a firm direction about the effects of delay to the jury, as Australian courts are, due to a decision of its High Court in Longman (1989) 168 CLR 79. However, Optican disputed that a Longman instruction is a criterion of justice in all cases.

Justice Madgwick found that trials would occur in New Zealand “without the guarantee of a strong warning by the judge to the jury as to the very real problems in meeting such old allegations. In Australia the applicants would have such a guarantee … however serious the charges”.

“There is no evidence the New Zealand justice system would not allow a fair and just trial of these defendants,” Arnold argued. “Our two legal systems are very similar, and are based on the age-old premise of being presumed innocent until proven, beyond reasonable doubt, to be guilty.”

“To allow these men to avoid being put to trial is tantamount to frustrating the legal system. To prejudge the complaint by preventing a trial and not allowing the facts of the case to be taken into account is a far greater travesty of justice.”

The complaints emerged in response to a publicised campaign inviting people to complain to the Order and receive a payment of compensation, Robertson said. Justice Madgwick found this might have compromised the reliability of much of the complainants’ evidence.

Robertson said many of the complainants had been interviewed repeatedly by the same psychiatrist and attended victims’ group sessions. Justice Madgwick found “There was ample opportunity for ‘tainting’ cross-fertilisation of complainants’ statements”.

The New Zealand practice of running ‘representative charges’ is not allowed in Australia. An NZ Lawyer source, who was in the public gallery during some of the appeal in Sydney, reported that when Justice Madgwick read Sir Robin Cooke’s defining judgment on representative charges, R v Accused [1993] 1 NZLR 385, he said, “How can anyone get a fair trial under these conditions? How can a man defend himself if he doesn’t know when the alleged offence is supposed to have happened?”

Optican commented, “Specimen charges are simply a response to the fact the case is old, and it is very hard to pin down precisely the specific moment the event occurred. But you have to ask whether the ability to do so is so fundamentally a criterion of justice that you don’t want to try the case. In some ways, this is giving the defendant a benefit because the event happened long ago”.

The spectator also reported Justice Madgwick read the judgment of New Zealand judge Justice Hansen in R v A & Anor HC CHCH CRI 2003-009-012476 (11 March 2005) relating to pre-trial applications from two other St John of God brothers, Lyall Forde and Bernard McGrath. Justice Madgwick asked counsel for New Zealand, “Have you read this? Destroys your argument that standards in New Zealand are the same as they are here, doesn’t it?” On being advised by counsel for New Zealand that it was being appealed, Justice Madgwick replied, “I should hope so”.

“The natural reaction is to resent interference from another country’s judicial system, but independent review from a respected source should be valued, and in the past the Privy Council has provided such review,” Ablett-Kerr QC said. “So, rather than take offence at the criticism, we should seize the opportunity to invite perhaps the Law Commission to examine the way our respected neighbour deals with the issues referred to in the decision, and see if we can’t improve our own system.”